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INTRODUCTION
"I was only following orders!" This phrase has been used so often,
in so many circumstances, that today it is its own parody. The legal,
moral, and personal implications of those words are rooted in man's
wartime conduct, as well as being his appeal for understanding and
absolution. It is a plea mouthed by both the relatively innocent junior
soldier and the duplicitous battlefield murderer. Does the phrase
merit serious legal consideration? Is it a legitimate defense to war
crimes today? Was it ever a legitimate defense to war crimes?
The topic has been frequently dissected, but it is not merely a
question of historical or academic interest. The issue of personal re-
sponsibility for wartime acts still exists and remains largely unre-
solved: just six years ago in Germany, former German Democratic
Republic border guards who killed German civilians fleeing to the
West raised obedience to superior orders as a defense for their
crimes;' three years ago in Rome, former German Secret Service
Captain Eric Priebke invoked the defense,2 as did French National
Assembly Deputy Maurice Papon in Paris.3 Today in The Hague,
Serb and Croat defendants raise the defense. This year, in Germany,
1. See Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Stafsachen [BGHSt] [Su-
preme Court] 39, 1-36 (F.R.G.) (involving the conviction of defendants for man-
slaughter and their sentencing to twenty months' suspended probation).
2. See John Hooper, Nazi War Crimes Trial Opens in Chaos, THE GUARDIAN,
May 9, 1996, at 3 (describing the opening of Erich Priebke's military trial in Rome
on the charge that he committed multiple homicides in Italy during World War II).
The Italian court eventually sentenced the 84-year-old Priebke to life in prison.
3. Cf Transcript of Indictment of Sept. 18 1996, Cour d'appel de Bordeaux,
Chambre d'Accusation Arrt du 18 Septembre 1996, no. 806 (pronouncing the in-
dictment of Maurice Papon for crimes against humanity); L 'arrt de la Chambre
d'Accusation (visited Sept. 20, 1996) <http://sudovest.com/papon/procedure/
page25.htm> (setting forth text of Maurice Papon's indictment); Maurice Peyrot,
Maurice Papon sera jug pour crimes contre l'humanit6, LE MONDE, Sept. 19,
1996 (detailing the history of the case and describing Papon's participation in the
arrest and deportation of over one thousand Jews as Secretary General of the Pre-
fecture of Gironde, France).
4. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, 37 I.L.M. 1182 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia, 1998) (sentencing judgment); see also Prosecutor v. Erdemo-
vic, 111 I.L.M. 298 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, App. Chamber,
1997); Prosecutor v. Edemovic, 108 I.L.R. 180 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber I, 1996).
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a former Gestapo agent, Alfons G6tzfried, is on trial for assisting in
the murder of 17,000 people, mostly Jews, at the Nazi death camp in
Maidanek, Poland during World War II. His defense? "I was only
following orders."'
To a certain extent, obedience to orders must be viewed as a le-
gitimate legal defense. Although the defense would not likely sit well
as an excuse for illegitimate acts of violence, the functioning of a
military force necessitates the expectation that soldiers will follow
orders, and that sometimes orders will be improper. Thus the plea for
exoneration by military defendants, tainted as it is by historical asso-
ciation with Nazi defendants,6 has long been the most significant and
difficult problem incidental to the punishment of battlefield depreda-
tions. As the United Nations War Crimes Commission noted a half-
century ago, "[t]he question of individual responsibility and punish-
ment in cases in which offenses were committed upon the orders of
a... superior authority by a subordinate pledged by law to obey su-
perior orders, is one of great difficulty."' Both before and since
World War I, the problem has found different legal solutions in dif-
ferent nations and until relatively recently there has been no fixed
ruling or principle in United States military law.'
Is the individual soldier immune from punishment because he car-
ried out his duties pursuant to the orders of a superior? It was not un-
til World War II that the question of personal responsibility appeared
resolved, bringing about significant change to this ancient defense.'
Indeed, World War II, Nuremberg, and the Subsequent Trials materi-
5. See Terence Neilan, German,: Er-Gestapo Agent on Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 28, 1999, at A10 (reporting the initiation of the German trial of former Ge-
stapo agent Alfons Gftzfried for war crimes).
6. See The United Nations War Crimes Commission, HISTORY OF THE UNITED
NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF
WAR, 287 (1948) [hereinafter HISTORY OF THE U.N. WAR CRIMES COMMISSIONI
(noting that most defendants before the International Military Tribunal at Nurem-
berg pled not guilty on grounds of superior orders).
7. See id. at 274 (stating the difficulty of resolving the question of account-
ability of those acting on orders of a superior).
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 287 (stating that the International Military Tribunal soundly re-
jected the defense of superior orders, though allowing it to mitigate punishment).
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ally altered the legal position of the soldier who pleaded obedience to
superior orders in defense of his war crimes." Supreme Court Justice
Robert Jackson noted at the opening of the Nuremberg International
Military Tribunal, "[s]ociety as modernly organized cannot tolerate
so broad an arch of official irresponsibility."'" That view, however,
was not always taken by the United States.
This Essay addresses the unresolved issues surrounding the supe-
rior orders defense. It traces the history of the defense through
United States' courts as well as international courts, including the
Leipzig Trials after World War I and the Nuremberg trials after
World War II. The Essay discusses the preferences between the li-
ability assigned to officers and enlisted personnel. Finally, it con-
cludes that the tension between the laws of war and the defense of
following superior's orders is not likely to be resolved in the near
future, as it reflects the underlying tension of the hierarchical mili-
tary structure.
I. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS
As it pertains to individuals, the law of war, 3 perhaps more than
any other branch of law, is liable to failure. Its goal is difficult-to
introduce moderation and restraint into an activity uniquely unsus-
ceptible to those qualities. At the best of times, the law of war is
"never more than imperfectly observed, and at worse times is very
poorly observed indeed."' 4 If the efficacy of the law of war was once
questionable, however, there is little doubt that today armed conflict
and soldiers' responsibility is governed, even if imperfectly, by a
11. See HISTORY OF THE U.N. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 287
(noting that at Nuremberg and in subsequent war crimes trials conducted by
American and British officials, all courts applied the principle that superior orders
did not exonerate subordinates from criminal liability).
12. Id. at 274.
13. See GEOFFREY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE (1981) 8-18 (distinguishing
the main branches of the law of war asjus ad bellum as the law governing going to
war andjus in bello as the law governing what warring parties do once engaged in
conflict). See generally id. for a discussion about the law of war and its develop-
ment from the Romans through modem times.
14. Id. at 11 (1981).
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broad interlocking grid of customary international law, treaties, and
domestic law.
The laws and customs of war date at least to the Greek Amphy-
cionic League, which forbade the destruction of places of worship in
wartime. 5 In the Middle Ages, the Synod of Charroux mandated ex-
communication of those who attacked women, peasants, and the
clergy in times of war.' 6 The concept of a just war emerged during
the Renaissance, differentiating between combatants and civilians,
and defining the concept of proportionality." Today, international
agreements like Geneva and Hague Conventions establish standards
of conduct for warring parties."8 So, in modern times, contrary to the
assertion that they are "almost imperceptible and hardly worth men-
tioning,"' 9 the laws of war remain the best resolution to the opposing
tensions of the necessities of war and the requirements of civiliza-
tion.
As ancient as the laws of war are, soldiers charged with violating
them have consistently raised obedience to orders as their defense.
One of the first recorded uses of the defense was in 1474, when Peter
von Hagenbach, Governor of Breisach, unsuccessfully raised it as a
defense to charges of murder, arson, and rape. ' Similarly unsuccess-
ful 130 years later was Captain Axtell, the guard commander at the
15. See Lois Tuttle & Ayesha Qayyum, International War Crimes Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, reprinted in War Crimes Tribunals, n.p. (Conference Ma-
terials, Regional Meeting of American Society of International Law, at American
University's Washington College of Law, Mar. 31-Apr. 1, 1998).
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 344 (Routledge 7th ed., 1997) (listing treaties codifying the
laws of war through 1980, including the Geneva Conventions of 1864 and 1906,
the three Hague Conventions of 1899 concerning the laws of land and maritime
warfare, and the thirteen Hague Conventions of 1907, dealing with many remain-
ing military issues).
19. Id. at 343. Many consider Clausewitz to be the greatest military writer of
the Nineteenth Century. Clausewtiz believed that military necessity was limited to
destroying an enemy's military power, thereby rendering civilian protections un-
necessary. See id.
20. Georg Schwarzenberger, INTERNATIONAL LAW, VOL. II THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT 462-66 (1968).
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execution of Charles 1.21 In the guard commander's case, the English
court held:
[The captain] justified all that he did was as a soldier, by the command of
his superior officer, whom he must obey or die. It was... no excuse, for
his superior was a traitor.., and where the command is traitorous, there
the obedience to that command is also traitorous. 22
Both von Hagenbach and Axtell were convicted and put to death,
showing that, even five hundred years ago, societies sought to fix
personal responsibility for wrongful acts, allowing for judgment
against and punishment of the individual. Then, as now, a victor's
crimes in battle might have been overlooked, yet even the most noble
societies faced their own black deeds, as well as those of the enemy.
Too often, those deeds arose not from passion raised in battle, but
from the calculated direction of superiors to subordinates.
In the Seventeenth Century, Hugo Grotius wrote "[i]f the authori-
ties issue any order that is contrary to the law of nature or to the
commandments of God, the order should not be carried out."' Con-
versely, the British Military Code of 1715, from which the United
States drafted its first military laws, provided that refusal to obey a
military order was a capital offense, regardless of whether the com-
mand was lawful.24 Indeed, cases from that period provide insight
into the development of the defense of obedience to orders in the
United States.
In early American history, municipal and state courts first halt-
21. A Report of Divers Cases in Pleas to the Crown, 84 Eng. Rep. 1055, 1060
(K.B. 1708) (commenting on the trial of Axtell, an officer who commanded the
guards at the trial of Charles I).
22. Id.
23. HUGO GROTIUs, 2 DE JURE BELLI AC PARIS LIBRI TRES [The Law of War
and Peace] 138 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925). Many identify Hugo Grotius as
the founder of international law; he was a proponent of the Naturalist School of
Legal Thought, which argues that one can derive basic principles of law from uni-
versal principles of justice founded on reason. See MALANCZUK, supra note 18, at
15.
24. See Hersch Lauterpacht, The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War
Crimes, 21 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 58, 71 n.1 (1944) (quoting the British Military
Code of 1715 and noting that the capital penalty existed without reference to the
lawfulness of the command).
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ingly defined the defense of superior orders in non-military civil and
criminal cases, applying it in cases related to employers' instructions
to employees, and police supervisors' orders to patrolmen. These
courts rejected the defense and held a subordinate responsible for
acting on illegal orders without regard for whether the order ap-
peared to the subordinate to be legal.25 In an 1813 civil case involv-
ing an American privateer, the court enunciated a civilian standard
that has stood the test of time: obedience to a superior's order is not a
legitimate defense if the subordinate knew or should have known that
the order was illegal.26
A. JUDICIALLY DECLARED: A FIRST
MILITARY STANDARD
The first recorded case of an American military officer pleading
the superior order defense to an offense grounded in international
law was that of Navy Captain George Little.:' In 1799, Little seized
the Danish ship Flying Fish2' during the United States' war with
France. Captain Little conducted the seizure pursuant to, but without
conforming to, the federal law on seizures, although he was com-
plying with President John Adams' written instructions as to how
United States naval commanders should carry out that law." The
owners of the Danish ship sued for damages, lost their case at trial,
but prevailed on appeal. '0 In the subsequent Supreme Court opinion,
25. See generally United States v. Bright, 24 F. Cas. 1232, 1234 (C.C.D. Pa.
1809) (No. 14,647) (concerning a state militia commander who acted under orders
of a state governor to prevent a United States Marshall from executing a federal
decree).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 26 F. Cas. 653, 654 (C.C.D. Pa. 1813)
(No. 15,494) (concerning a first lieutenant of a United States privateer accused of
committing acts of piracy on order of his superior).
27. See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) (involving the illegal
seizure of a foreign vessel under orders of President John Adams).
28. See id. at 176.
29. See id. at 177-78 (observing that an act of Congress permitted the seizure
and forfeiture of ships bound to any French port, but noting that the President's in-
structions erroneously authorized the seizure of vessels bound both to and from
French ports).
30. See id. at 172, 175.
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Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that naval commanders, in obey-
ing presidential instructions at variance with the language of the un-
derlying law, acted at their peril and were liable for damages. Be-
cause the law did not strictly warrant the instructions, the
commander was answerable for his actions." In other words, if the
instruction was illegal, the subordinate may not obey it, and any sub-
ordinate who would obey was responsible for not recognizing its il-
legality. 2
This heavy burden of legal interpretation for the unsophisticated
military officer of the period was even greater for the unschooled
seaman or soldier. There were no recorded cases of enlisted military
persons being charged with committing illegal acts pursuant to a su-
perior's order from this time, however, an opinion addressing that
situation would have to wait another sixty-three years."
In 1813, Captain Little's unsuccessful defense was raised in an-
other federal case involving a superior's command and it was again
rejected. 4 This time it was John Jones, the first lieutenant of a priva-
teer who pleaded his captain's order in defense to charges of his as-
sault and theft on board a captured ship. In instructing the jury about
this defense, the judge said:
No military or civil officer can command an inferior to violate the laws of
his country; nor will such command excuse, much less justify the
act... the participation of the inferior officer, in an act he knows, or ought
31. See id. at 178.
32. See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804) (stating that the
presidential instructions "cannot... legalize an act which without these instruc-
tions would have been a plain trespass"); see also United States v. Bevans, 24 F.
Cas. 1138, 1140 (C.C.D. Mass. 1816) (No. 14,549) (opining that if a sentry on or-
ders illegally killed a man, the orders could not justify or excuse the murder). But
see Neu v. McCarthy, 33 N.E.2d 570, 573 (Mass. 1941) (adopting rule that obedi-
ence to a military order justifies a criminal act unless the order "was so palpably
unlawful that a reasonable man in the position of the person obliging it would per-
ceive its unlawful quality").
33. See McCall v. McDowell, 15 F. Cas. 1235, 1247 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867) (No.
8,673) (holding that obedience to the order of a superior military officer is a com-
plete defense for an illegal act; whereas the superior officer is liable).
34. See United States v. Jones, 26 F. Cas. 653, 657-58 (C.C.D. Pa 1813) (No.
15,494) (dismissing the validity of the superior orders defense as repugnant to rea-
son). The jury returned a verdict of not guilty, but Jones' strongest defense was one
of mistaken identity.
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to know to be illegal, will not be excused by the order of his superior."
Thus the Little standard remained intact, made clearer by the lan-
guage in Jones: an officer, military or civil, is liable for those orders
that he knows, or should know, to be illegal.
Complicating the idea that a soldier was liable for illegal acts car-
ried out at the direction of a superior officer is that fact that soldiers
were also liable if they did not carry out orders. In an 1849 case, Pri-
vate Samuel Dinsman, a Marine embarked upon the USS Vincennes,
was charged with disobeying the orders of the ship's captain and
consequently received twenty-four lashes and confinement in pun-
ishment 6 In approving that punishment, the Supreme Court empha-
sized the authority of military officers and the folly of a subordinate
like Dinsman questioning the orders issued by those vested with
authority:
[An officer's] position... in many respects, becomes quasi judicial ....
Especially it is proper, not only that a public officer, situated like the de-
fendant, be invested with a wide discretion, but be upheld in it .... [l]t is
not enough to show he committed an error in judgment, but it must have
been a malicious and willful error."
Early on, the Supreme Court's view of officer-enlisted relation-
ships, based in part upon British cases," allowed little room for
questioning the superior's orders and, in terms of judicial review,
promoted an adherence to a doctrinal respondeat superior approach
to the obedience of orders, regardless of whether the orders were le-
gal.
In 1851, thirty-eight years after Little, the Supreme Court decided
a similar issue with the same result, asserting that military officers
are liable for illegal acts, regardless of whether the acts are commit-
ted pursuant to superiors' orders. Chief Justice Roger Taney added,
35. Id. at 657-58.
36. See Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 88, 91-92 (1849) (detailing that
the Marine's four-year term expired while on expedition, whereupon he refused to
perform further duties, was detained, and repeatedly flogged).
37. Id. at 129-30.
38. See id. at 129-31 (listing British cases on which the lWilkes Court relies).
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"[t]he [superior's] order may palliate, but it cannot justify."" This
dictum suggested that a superior's order might mitigate an offense
and lead to a lesser punishment, but it would not excuse the subordi-
nate's behavior.
Until the Little decision, the focus had been on either the officer's
legal responsibility for issuing an improper order or on the subordi-
nate's penalty for disobeying the officer's proper order. The courts
had not yet addressed the liability of enlisted personnel. In 1867,
however, a federal district court addressed an enlisted man's liability
not for disobeying, but for executing illegal superior orders. In
McCall v. McDowell,0 the court declared that "[e]xcept in a plain
case... where at first blush it is apparent and palpable to the com-
monest understanding that the order is illegal, I cannot but think that
the law should excuse the military subordinate when acting in obedi-
ence to the orders of his commander."4 ' Thus, after 1867, in at least
one federal district, enlisted soldiers and sailors were essentially off
the legal hook. Connecting Captain Little's 1804 Supreme Court
opinion with McCall's 1867 district court opinion establishes a first,
if little noted, implicit standard for military personnel: the acts of
subordinates were protected by the orders of their superiors, unless
such orders were clearly illegal. The superior remained liable for any
illegal act or order given.
Throughout the Nineteenth Century, Great Britain took much the
same tack as the United States. During the Napoleonic Wars, for ex-
ample, a young British ensign followed an order of his superior and
killed a French prisoner. The Scottish court rejected the ensign's plea
of superior orders in terms recognizable to an American officer of
the day: "If an officer were to command a soldier to go out to the
street and to kill you or me, he would not be bound to obey. It must
be a legal order ... every officer has a discretion to disobey orders
39. Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 137 (1851) (holding that a
colonel who expropriated a merchant's property for military use during the Mexi-
can-American War was liable for trespass and could not invoke his superior's or-
ders as a justification); see also Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 169 (1879) (refer-
ring to the Mitchell Decision with approval).
40. 15 F. Cas. 1235 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867).
41. Id. at 1240.
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against the known laws of the land."42
B. THE CIVIL WAR: AMERICA'S INITIAL LAW OF WAR MANUAL
In the mid-nineteenth century, the law of war continued to develop
from a body of custom and tradition into a more substantial written
system of rules, eventually giving way to international compacts and
treaties. The Lieber Code was instrumental in that transformation."
During the Civil War (1861-65), Francis Lieber, a German-born
Columbia Law School professor who had fought in the Prussian
Army against Napoleon, and who had three sons soldiering in the
Civil War,4 wrote what came to be known as the Lieber Code.
Promulgated in 1863 as General Orders Number 100, the Code's 157
articles contained detailed discussion of the treatment of prisoners
and noncombatants, as well as direction on the pursuit of warfare's
objectives. Often regarded as the first general codification of the
laws of war, the Lieber Code "served as the quarry from which all
the subsequent codes were cut."4" For American troops, Lieber's
formulation would remain in force until the World War I.
However, the Lieber Code did not address the question of whether
superior orders could justify a violation of any of its rules.' Appar-
ently, Lieber, a lawyer, presumed that soldiers would obey their su-
periors and that the opinions announced by domestic courts wouldcontol te " 47
control the issue. Despite the Code's silence on the point, the Civil
42. Alan M. Wilner, Superior Orders As A Defense to 1'iolations of Interna-
tional Criminal Law, 26 MD. L. REV. 127, 130 (1966) (citing 11 BUCHANAN,
REPORTS OF REMARKABLE TRIALS 3, 58 (1813) on Ensign Marwell, an early Eng-
lish case).
43. See James R. Miles, Francis Lieber and the Law of War, 29 Revue de Droit
Miltaire et de Droit de la Guerre [Review of Military Law and the Law of War]
253, 255 (1990) (stating that the Lieber Code represented the first codification of
the modem law of war and formed the basis for early European codes).
44. See id. at 253. Two sons, one of whom later became Judge Advocate Gen-
eral of the Army, fought for the Union; another son fought and died for the Con-
federacy. See id.
45. BEST, supra note 13, at 171.
46. See Wilner, supra note 42, at 131 (observing that the Lieber Code did not
address the subject of obedience to orders).
47. See id. (remarking that Lieber undoubtedly assumed that earlier domestic
court rules would apply).
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War raised another opportunity for a court to rule on the issue; this
time a military court.
A military commission tried Major Henry Wirz, the Swiss doctor
and commandant of the Andersonville, Georgia prisoner of war camp
where an estimated 12,000 Union soldiers died. 4 The Union charged
Wirz with conspiracy to maltreat federal prisoners and thirteen
counts of murder.49 Wirz pleaded that he had only obeyed his superi-
ors' orders. 0 Like von Hagenbach nearly four hundred years before,
Wirz's plea was denied. The commission found Wirz personally re-
sponsible for battlefield excesses and sentenced him to be hanged."
Wirz thereby became the only soldier of either side in the Civil War
to be executed for a war crime.
C. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: AN EVOLVING STANDARD
The Civil War ended and a new century turned, but obedience to
orders continued as a valid defense not only for enlisted men,2 but
also for civilians tried in civil courts. 3 In South Africa, an English
military case, Regina v. Smith," reached the same conclusion as
American courts. "[I]f a soldier honestly believes he is doing his duty
48. See 8 AMERICAN STATE TRIALS, 666 ff. (1918), reprinted in The Law of
War at 783 (Leon Friedman ed., 1972).
49. See id. at 798 (delineating the charges against Wirz and the military court's
findings on each of the thirteen counts).
50. See id. at 792.
51. See id. at 798 (providing President Andrew Johnson's direction that Wirz
be executed on Friday, November 10, 1865).
52. See, e.g., In re Fair, 100 F. 149, 154 (D. Neb. 1900) (stating the rule that a
subordinate is protected in obeying a superior officer's order so long as the order
does not express or show clear illegality).
53. See Hately v. State, 15 Ga. 346, 348 (1854) (holding both an employer and
his clerk guilty of giving alcohol to a slave, and rejecting the clerk's defense of
obedience to orders). The court continued by stating that "every person, agent as
well as principle, is responsible for his or her criminal conduct and cannot plead
the ... commands of another ... except where he or she acts under coercion." Id.;
see also Thomas v. State, 33 So. 130, 132 (Ala. 1902) (stating that a person par-
ticipating in a robbery under the command of a superior is not excused or justified
if there was no coercion or fear of death or serious bodily harm).
54. 17 Special Courts Reports of Cape of Good Hope, 56 (S. Af. 1900), re-
printed in Nico KEIJZER, MILITARY OBEDIENCE 173 (1978) (discussing famous
cases related to orders to commit illegal acts).
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in obeying the commands of his superior, and if the orders are not so
manifestly illegal that he must or ought to have known they were
unlawful, the soldier would be protected by the orders of his supe-
rior." 55 The Boer War provided several cases involving the defense,
the most notorious of which involved Lieutenant Harry H. "Breaker"
Morant, who failed in asserting a defense of superior orders and was
sentenced to execution.56
For the United States and Great Britain, the mid-Nineteenth Cen-
tury standard remained fixed: an officer was criminally responsible
for the issuance or execution of orders he knew, or should have
known to be illegal. Subordinates, in turn, were not liable for illegal
orders they carried out, unless the illegality of those orders was clear.
Case law began to define what "clear illegality" meant. Two ci-
vilian appellate opinions referred to illegal orders as those whose il-
legality was "apparent and palpable to the commonest understand-
ing,"57 and "so plain as not to admit of a reasonable doubt.""
Nevertheless, confusion as to the meaning of "clear illegality" per-
sisted into the Twentieth, and arguably, into the Twenty-First Cen-
tury.
The years before World War I saw an increase in the codification
of the laws of war. The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907" ar-
ticulated the basic rules of land warfare, which the international
community still follows today. Any similar ventures since those con-
ventions have not been politically possible. Conventions adopted
since World War I have, to an extent, essentially refined and speci-
55. Id. at 174 (emphasis in original).
56. See generally KIT DENTON, CLOSED FILE (1983) (recounting the truth be-
hind the fictionalized story of "Breaker" Morant, which is far different from the
movie).
57. In re Fair, 100 F. at 155 (C.C.D. Neb. 1900) (holding that the order direct-
ing the accused to kill an escaping military prisoner was not palpably illegal, thus
the state lacked criminal jurisdiction).
58. Commonwealth ex rel. Wadsworth v. Shortall, 55 A. 952, 956 (Pa. 1903)
(quoting HARE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW).
59. See DONALD A. WELLS, THE LAWS OF LAND WARFARE: A GUIDE TO THE
U.S. ARMY MANUALS 8 (1992) (quoting Dietrich Schindler, a professor of law at
the University of Zurich).
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fled the principles in those Hague agreements.6
In 1906, Lassa Oppenheim, a prominent British international law
professor and publicist, postulated that obedience to superior orders
constituted a complete and absolute defense to criminal prosecution.
"If members of the armed forces commit violations by order of their
Government, they are not war criminals and cannot be punished by
the enemy .... In case members of forces commit violations ordered
by their commanders, the members cannot be punished, for the
commanders are alone responsible.... .6"
Anchoring his formulation on an interpretation of then-traditional
concepts of international law, he intertwined obedience to orders
with respondeat superior and its related Act of State Doctrine. In
doing so, Oppenheim was instrumental in bringing about a sea
change to the soldiers' obedience defense. There was no personal re-
sponsibility, Oppenheim held, when superiors ordered criminal acts.
Oppenheim later wrote Great Britain's 1912 handbook on the rules
of land warfare, completely revising its first 1903 manual. The new
handbook incorporated Oppenheim's dicta that, for subordinates,
obedience to orders constituted a complete defense to violations of
the law of war.
Oppenheim's influence was not felt only in England. Looking to
Great Britain's example, as the United States historically had done in
matters of military law, and to a lesser degree to France's new man-
ual on the topic, America revised Lieber's General Orders 100 and in
1914 published its first manual relating to the law of war.62 Reflect-
ing recent Hague and Geneva Conventions as well as Oppenheim's
formulation, the Rules of Land Warfare described law of war viola-
tions, such as the use of poisoned weapons, declaration of no quarter,
the maltreatment of bodies and prisoners, bombardment of hospitals,
60. See id. (describing the progression of the Army manuals and the sources
used to develop the 1934 version of The Rules of Land Warfare).
61. 2 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATIsE, 264-65 (1st ed.
1906) (emphasis in original).
62. See WELLS, supra note 59, at 5 (describing the first edition of The Rules of
Land Wafare in 1914). Developments in international law necessitated the new
manual. New weaponry and conflict strategies were included, as well as references
to the international congresses and declarations that the United States recognized at
the time.
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and mistreatment of civilians.63 In treating defenses to such acts, the
Rules of Land Warfare read: "[I]ndividuals of the armed forces will
not be punished for these offenses in case they are committed under
the orders or sanction of their government or commanders. The
commanders ordering the commission of such acts... may be pun-
ished by the belligerent into whose hands they may fall."'4
With this paragraph, the United States' published policy joined
Britain's revised manual in making a subordinate's obedience to or-
ders a complete legal defense, setting aside American military and
civilian case law of the previous 110 years. While the United States
manual stated that officers ordering illegal acts "may be punished,"
the following phrase, "by the belligerent into whose hands they may
fall," suggests that, should the officer never be captured, or should he
be of the ultimately victorious army, any punishment at all would be
problematic. While military manuals, though official, are not puni-
tive and therefore cannot be the basis of court-martial charges, they
nevertheless are declarative of governmental policy.
Curiously, Imperial Germany, where obedience was popularly
thought to be absolute, employed a different and less forgiving rule.
Imperial courts punished subordinates if they executed an order
knowing that it "related to an act which obviously aimed at a
crime. 65 Such a ruling is comparable to the holding of McCall v.
McDowell, and the pre-1914 United States military standard.
For American soldiers, Article 64 of the Articles of War, 1912,"
was also pertinent to the issue of obedience of orders. The United
States Army explained Article 64, the willful disobedience of a supe-
rior officer, in its first law manual, the Manual for Courts-Martial,
Courts of Inquiry and Other Procedure Under Militar , Law ("Man-
ual for Courts-Martial").67 The Manual for Courts-Martial discus-
63. See generally id. (outlining the development of United States Army Manu-
als and comparing sections of manuals from different years).
64. See id. at 118 (quoting paragraph 366 of the 1914 version of The Rules of
Land Warfare).
65. United States v. Ohlendorf [1947] U.S. Military Tribunal, Nuremberg,
TWC, IV, at 471.
66. See Act of Mar. 2, 1913 (37 Stat. 723).
67. See A MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, COURTS OF INQUIRY AND OTHER
PROCEDURE UNDER MILITARY LAw 208 (1918) [hereinafter MANUAL FOR
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sion of Article 64 noted that willful disobedience of "any lawful
command of his superior officer" was punishable.6 ' Further, "[a]n ac-
cused can not be convicted of a violation of this article if the order
was in fact unlawful; but, unless the order is plainly illegal, the dis-
obedience of it is punishable. ,.9 In examining the usual military
offense of disobedience, the Manual for Courts-Martial did not take
into account Paragraph 366 of the Rules of Land Warfare, which ex-
amined the unusual instance of battlefield war crimes. 7
However, there was no actual conflict between the two manuals. If
a soldier obeyed a superior's order to shoot the prisoners, the issue of
disobedience did not arise; the Rules of Land Warfare protected the
soldier from punishment for his illegal act, as superior orders were
the soldier's complete defense." ' If the soldier refused to obey the or-
der to shoot the prisoners, the Manual for Courts-Martial protected
him, as the order's illegality exempted him from prosecution for dis-
obedience.
American soldiers fought World War I under the guidelines de-
lineated in these two manuals, while United States civilian law con-
tinued a steady and contrary path regarding obedience to orders.
D. WORLD WAR I: THE UNITED STATES STANDARD
NOT IN EVIDENCE
During World War I, the Allies considered punishing any German
who had violated the law of war, from the Kaiser to the lowest con-
script. At the war's conclusion, the Preliminary Peace Conference
created the Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of the
War and on the Enforcement of Penalties to study the issue of ac-
COURTS-MARTIAL] (addressing Article 64 and the United States' military stan-
dards for disrespect toward a superior officer).
68. Id. at 208.
69. Id. at210.
70. See United States Army, Rules of Land Warfare 129 (1914) (examining
such offenses as the killing of wounded soldiers and the mistreatment of prisoners
of war inter alia).
71. See id. (stating that individual members of the armed forces will not be
punished for these offenses if they are committed under the order or sanction of
their government or commanders).
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countability for the war.' In March 1919, the Conference reported
that "military authorities cannot be relieved from responsibility by
the mere fact that a higher authority might have been convicted of
the same offense." 73 The Conference declared that the courts would
determine whether a plea of superior orders was sufficient to acquit
the person charged.' While this statement by the Commission con-
cerned primarily senior governmental and military authorities, it was
equally applicable to more junior officers. Consequently, the Allies
drafted Article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles, which decreed their
intention to "[b]ring before military tribunals persons accused of
having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war.""
Thus, contrary to the American, British, and French manuals of the
day, Article 228 evinced the collective intention of the Allies to ap-
ply individual responsibility for law of war violations, without regard
for the defense of superior orders. The Allies rejected the then-
current United States military standard. As one international law
scholar of the period wrote:
[Article 228] appears to be the first treaty of peace in which an attempt
has been made by the victorious belligerent to enforce against the de-
feated adversary the application of the principle of individual responsibil-
ity for criminal acts during war by members of his armed forces
against... the other party.' 6
On the issue of personal criminal responsibility, however, the
Commission found that the Americans, whose military had retreated
from that concept with its Rule of Land Warfare Manual, were sur-
72. See Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on
Enforcement of Penalties, Report Presented to the Preliminar Peace Conference,
14 AM. J. INT'L L. 95, 117 (1920) (describing the creation and composition of the
Commission). The Commission was composed of fifteen members, two each from
the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, and the other five
members elected from the powers with special interests.
73. See id. (inquiring into the breaches of the laws and customs of war com-
mitted by the forces of the German Empire).
74. See id. at 117.
75. See Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1929, art. 228, Major Peace Treaties of
Modem History Vol. II, 1288 (1967).
76. James W. Garner, Punishment of Offenders Against the Laws and Customs
of War, 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 70, 70-71 (1920).
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prisingly resistant. The United States' representatives to the Com-
mission believed that there was no international law making war
crimes an individually punishable offense and feared the establish-
ment of precedent that might be applicable to national leaders in the
future. Accordingly, the United States representatives objected to
charging, without distinction of rank, enemy authorities who ordered
or who failed to prevent violations of the laws of war.77 If morally
and legally questionable by today's lights, that position was consis-
tent with then-current military thinking as reflected in American
manuals. The United States and the United Kingdom opposed the
creation of a new tribunal to try war criminals and the promulgation
of new laws or penalties."
The majority of the Commission rejected the American objections
and disassociated itself from the position of the United States and
United Kingdom. Nevertheless, "the Commission did not consider it
within its province... to lay down detailed principles for the guid-
ance of national courts in the matter., 79 The British and Americans
remained unmoved. At the end of the day, the issue remained unre-
solved and the work of the Commission led not to an international
tribunal for war criminals, but rather the Leipzig Trials, the only war
crimes proceedings to be held after the World War I.
The Commission identified 896 alleged battlefield war criminals.'
Germany protested the trial of its nationals by foreign courts. Due to
the instability of the German Government, the Allies compromised
and agreed to allow Germany to prosecute a selected number of indi-
viduals before the Criminal Senate of the Imperial Court of Justice of
Germany, which presided in Leipzig." The number of accused
77. See UNITED NATIONS, HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE QUESTION OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 56-58 (1960) (stating that, on the issue of
uniform military liability for violations of laws of war, "the American representa-
tives were unalterably opposed").
78. See id. at 59.
79. See Wilner, supra note 42, at 134 (detailing the statistics of the Leipzig tri-
als).
80. See WAR CRIMES: REPORT OF THE WAR CRIMES INQUIRY 46 (1989) (refer-
encing Germany's agreeing to surrender those who had committed war crimes for
trial by various military tribunals).
81. See id. at 46.
498 [15:481
THE LAw OF WAR
shrank to forty-five, and the Allies allowed Germany to prosecute its
own citizens in what became known as the Leipzig Trials. The Impe-
rial Court eventually tried only twelve of the forty-five. According to
one source, during the trials that went forward, "the doctrine of supe-
rior orders and the plea of military necessity were elevated to para-
mount legal principles."" Although the maximum punishment for
war crimes was then, as it is today, death, the Court acquitted six of
the twelve, and issued sentences to confinement of less than one year
to three of the remaining six. The Court imposed its longest sentence,
four-years, to an individual who later escaped to Sweden after only a
few months. Commentators regarded the Leipzig Trials, as a whole,
to be a farce.83
There were, however, Leipzig proceedings that provide a window
to the Imperial Court's rationale behind its concept of obedience to
orders. In a harbinger of Grand Admiral Karl Donitz's World War II
Nuremberg trial, the Allies charged Grand Admiral Turpitz, Secre-
tary of State of the German Navy from August 1914 to March 1916,
with having originated and issued orders for unrestricted submarine
warfare. The Court, however, ultimately found that Turpitz was not
responsible for the unrestricted submarine warfare and he was ac-
quitted. Instead, the Imperial Court found responsibility with the Su-
preme Command of Naval Operations, presumably the ex-Kaiser
himself. The Allies did not specifically charge the former Kaiser
with violations of the law of war. Regardless of the charge, the Neth-
erlands, where the Kaiser fled following his abdication, refused to
surrender him to the Allies for trial. +'
There were two other notable Leipzig cases that involved the de-
fense of superior orders. Lieutenant Karl Neumann, commander of a
German submarine, admitted that he had torpedoed and sunk the
British hospital ship, Dover Castle, but pleaded that he did so only in
obedience to orders issued by the Admiralty."5 Indeed, the German
82. See Wilner, supra note 42, at 134 (recounting the Leipzig trials and declar-
ing them to be worthless).
83. See id.
84. See L.C. Green, Is There an hiternational Criminal Lawv?. 21 ALBERTA L.
REv. 251,254 (1983).
85. See Judgment in Case of Comnander Karl Neumann. Hospital Ship "Do-
ver Castle," 16 AM. J. INT'L L. 704, 708 (1921) (acquitting the defendant in the
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Government had asserted that the enemy was using hospital ships for
military purposes, in violation of customary international law, and
declared on March 19, 1917 that German submarines would attack
hospital ships not complying with several German conditions. The
Imperial Court held that Neumann believed the order to be a lawful
reprisal, as the order specified, and therefore was not personally re-
sponsible for the sinking of the Dover Castle.86 In support of its
holding, the Court applied the German obedience to orders standard
delineated in Section 47(2) of the German Military Penal Code, 7
which stated that a subordinate acting in conformity with superior
orders is liable to punishment only when he knows his orders con-
stitute a felony or misdemeanor. Applying the German standard, the
Imperial Court acquitted Neumann."
A similar case, however, saw a different result and actually set a
standard for obedience to orders. The Allies charged Lieutenants
Ludwig Dithmar and Johann Boldt, of the submarine U-86, for the
sinking of a Canadian hospital ship, the Llandovery Castle.9 At trial,
the evidence revealed that, just after the sinking, Captain Helmuth
Patzig sought to conceal the sinking of the hospital ship and ordered
the two accused subordinates to help kill the survivors.9° Patzig and
another officer machine-gunned the survivors in lifeboats and in the
water, assisted by Dithmar and Boldt who spotted targets and main-
Dover Castle case and holding that the defendant had sunk the Dover Castle fol-
lowing orders from his highest superiors, which he considered binding, and there-
fore could not be punished for his conduct).
86. See id. at 708.
87. See MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 440
(1959) (quoting Section 47 of the German Military Penal Code, which stated that
subordinates can be punished for going beyond the scope of the orders given him,
or for acting on orders he knows to be against civil or military law).
88. See id. at 706-07 (accepting Neumann's assertion that he was following the
orders of the German Admiralty, which had recently issued memoranda advising
that hospital ships were no longer protected from attack).
89. See Judgment in Case of Lieutenants Dithmar and Boldt, Hospital Ship
"Llandovery Castle," 16 AM. J. INT'L L. 708, 723 (1921) (holding that the subor-
dinates were guilty, but their habit of obedience to military authority mitigated
their offenses).
90. See id. at 718-19 (holding only Patzig, Dithmar, Boldt, and the chief boat-
swain's mate Meissner responsible for the firing on the lifeboats). According to the
court, the rest of the crew was below deck, readying for submersion. Id. at 714.
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tained a lookout.9' The officers sunk at least two lifeboats. 2 The Im-
perial Court was unable to determine a precise number of casualties
from the gunfire because many of the survivors drowned or were
victims of shark attacks.93
The Court dismissed the charge against Patzig and ruled that since
he had taken refuge in the then-independent state of Danzig, he was
beyond extradition. Like Neumann in the Dover Castle case, Dith-
mar and Boldt pleaded "not guilty" on the basis of superior orders
from the German naval high command. Also like Neumann, the
Court found that Dithmar and Boldt were not guilty of sinking the
hospital ship by reason of obedience to superior orders. The Imperial
Court found them guilty as accessories to homicide, however, due to
their help with machine-gunning of the survivors. ' In explaining its
ruling, the Court stated:
According to the Military Penal Code, if the execution of an order... in-
volves such a violation of law as is punishable, the superior officer issu-
ing such an order is alone responsible. However, the subordinate obeying
such an order is liable to punishment if it was known to him that the or-
der... involved the infringement of civil or military law. This applies in
the case of the accused.95
Even for the Leipzig judges, shooting survivors in the water was
manifestly contrary to customary international law. Applying a test
of actual knowledge, the judges found that Dithmar and Boldt had
knowledge or should have had knowledge that their actions were
against the law of war.96
91. See id. at 719 (outlining the facts as the Imperial Court understood them).
92. See id. (interpreting the fact that witnesses confirmed that several lifeboats
left the Llandovery Castle after it was torpedoed but only one was recovered indi-
cates that Captain Patzig and the defendants attempted to eliminate all witnesses).
93. See Judgment in Case of Lieutenants Dithmar and Boldt. Hospital Ship
"Llandovery Castle," 16 AM. J. INT'L L. 708, 709 (1921) (outlining the facts of the
boats involved in the case and the statements of witnesses to estimate the number
of persons killed in both the torpedoing of the hospital ship and the gunfire after-
wards).
94. See id. at 711 (pronouncing judgment against the defendants for having
taken part in homicide and sentencing each to four years' imprisonment).
95. Id. at721.
96. See id. at 722 (stating that their very position as naval officers indicates
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At Leipzig, in the Twentieth Century's first significant effort to
assess criminal responsibility for battlefield war crimes, the former
enemy's court, reviled for the insincerity and feebleness of its prose-
cutions, generally failed to assess personal responsibility for war
crimes. In the Dithmar and Boldt cases, however, the Imperial Court
applied the more strict German military code's standard, not the re-
vised standard of the American and British victors. It was ironic in
that the German standard was similar to the one from which the
American victors had retreated in both their peace negotiations and
their law of war manuals. The German standard was that subordi-
nates were liable for carrying out orders they knew to be illegal, or
should have known to be illegal. Likewise, officers issuing orders
that they knew, or should have known, to be illegal, were personally
liable. Whatever irony there might have been in the convictions of
Dithmar and Boldt dissipated when, several months after trial, both
escaped, apparently with the connivance of their jailers.97
Throughout the inter-war period, the American soldier's defense
of obedience to orders remained unchanged, largely because of a
lack of incentive to change the defense, and the military and civilian
courts failed to address it. In 1920, the leading military legal scholar
of the era, Army Colonel William Winthrop, wrote "[t]hat the act
charged as an offense was done in obedience to the order-verbal or
written-of a military superior, is, in general, a good defense at
military law."'98 A few lines later, however, he added:
The order, to constitute a defense, must be a legal one .... It is the 'law-
ful command of his superior officer' which by the 21st Article of War,
'any officer or soldier' may be punished even with death for disobey-
ing .... Where the order is apparently regular and lawful on its face, he is
not to go behind it to satisfy himself that his superior has proceeded with
authority, but is to obey it... [except] orders so manifestly beyond the
legal power or discretion of the commander as to admit of no rational
doubt of their unlawfulness. 99
their knowledge that they were not permitted to kill defenseless people).
97. See Sheldon Glueck, By What Tribunal Shall War Offenders Be Tried?, 56
HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1943).
98. WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 296 (1920) (pro-
viding a comprehensive treatise on military law).
99. Id. at 296-97 (emphasis in original).
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This caveat to the standard announced in the Rules of Land War-
fare was Winthrop's addition. While the Manual on Courts-Martial
did not include a similar provision, Winthrop based the addition of
the caveat on common sense and historical practice, even though it
was not the official United States position." There was no assess-
ment of the authority of Winthrop's addition at court-martial, as the
nation was at peace and without occasion for a war crimes trial.
Today, it is clear that military law requires soldiers to presume the
lawfulness of their orders.'0 ' Case law suggests that, even if a soldier
questions the legality of an order, but remains unsure, a court will not
hold him liable for obeying an unlawful order." As the Nuremberg
Tribunal noted, it is not "incumbent upon a soldier in a subordinate
position to screen the orders of superiors for questionable points of
legality.'
10 3
With little critical discussion between the wars concerning obedi-
ence to orders, the debate centered on the offense of disobedience,
rather than obedience. The Rules of Land Warfare made superior or-
ders a complete defense to battlefield war crimes. The common
military offense of disobedience, which an accused justified by
proving the illegality of the order, had little bearing on the war crime
defense of obedience of orders. Winthrop's assertion, that if an order
appeared regular and lawful on its face the subordinate had no right
to go behind it to question the superior's authority to issue the order,
only tended to strengthen the defense raised by the Rules of Land
Warfare.
100. See, e.g., id. at 296-97.
101. See Unger v. Ziemniak, 27 M.J. 349, 359 (C.M.A. 1989) (holding that su-
perior order was lawful, and thus, charges would go forward against subordinates
for disobedience of order). Once the defense raises the issue of lawfulness by some
evidence, the prosecution has the burden to prove lawfulness beyond a reasonable
doubt. See United States v. Tiggs, 40 C.M.R. 352, 354 (A.B.R. 1968) (affirming
conviction of defendant due to correct application of the beyond a reasonable
doubt burden on prosecution).
102. See United States v. Kinder, 14 C.M.R. 742, 750 (A.F.B.R. 1954) (affirm-
ing conviction of defendant for murder because "the order was so obviously be-
yond the scope of authority of the superior officer and so palpably illegal on its
face as to admit of no doubt of its unlawfulness to a man of ordinary sense and un-
derstanding").
103. In re von Leeb, in XI T.W.C. BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MIL. TRIBS.. 510-
11(1950).
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E. THE AMERICAN STANDARD: A GENESIS?
Before and during this period, the customary international laws of
war were considered to apply primarily to nations rather than indi-
viduals. The Act of State Doctrine, in the context of domestic courts,
held that no state could exercise jurisdiction over another state. The
courts based this position upon principles of the sovereignty and
equality of states. Associated with this doctrine, the courts regarded
sovereignty as attaching to particular individuals within a state, not
just as an abstract manifestation of the existence and power of the
state itself. The sovereign was a definable person to whom allegiance
was due and, as an integral part of his or her mystique, the court
could not subject the sovereign to the judicial processes of his coun-
try. Similarly, the courts considered it proper that a foreign court
could not subject a sovereign to its jurisdiction.' ° Vestiges of this
doctrine survive, of course, in today's exemption from suit for cer-
tain governmental entities and persons officially acting for those en-
tities-the Feres Doctrine. °5 In 1918, however, the Allies' post-war
attempts to hold the Kaiser personally and criminally responsible as
an "author" of the war represented a significant assault on the Act of
State Doctrine. In the Twentieth Century, the doctrine was dying, but
in the 1920s and '30s it was not yet moribund.
It was an aspect of the Act of State Doctrine that allowed the
United States and the United Kingdom to view military officers as
personifications of their states. If the state-exempt from criminal
process-ordered a common soldier to act, the soldier had no choice
but to obey. Having no choice, the soldier must be free of liability for
that act. Nevertheless, Western states were beginning to recognize
that military officers were not credible embodiments of the state. The
West had questioned the orders of kaisers, kings, and commanders,
which thereby placed the doctrine in doubt. Professor Ian Brownlie
104. See Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) (holding
that a public vessel of war of a foreign sovereign at peace with the United States is
exempt from the jurisdiction of the United States). Schooner Exchange is the clas-
sic case illustrating the relationship between territorial jurisdiction and sovereign
immunity.
105. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 159 (1950) (holding that the
United States is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to mem-
bers of the armed forces resulting from the negligence of others in the armed
forces).
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reports that "[i]n the extensive literature on the question of interna-
tional crimes and international jurisdiction which has appeared since
1920 a considerable number of writers have envisaged criminal re-
sponsibility of states alone.... ."'06 As to individual criminal respon-
sibility, he continues, "it is nevertheless suggested that the concept
has no legal value, cannot be justified in principle, and is contra-
dicted by... international law."'07 By the time of World War II, the
West had effectively rejected the Act of State Doctrine.'r
The numerous bilateral and multinational treaties of the inter-war
period were silent on the subject of superior orders, with the excep-
tion of the 1922 Washington Treaty relating, inter alia, to submarine
warfare.' 9 With World War I's recent unhappy prosecutions of sub-
marine commanders in mind, Article II of the Washington Treaty de-
clared that "[a]ny person... who shall violate any of these rules,
whether or not such person is under orders of a governmental supe-
rior, shall be deemed to have violated the laws of war and shall be
liable to trial and punishment. .. .,""o The future World War II com-
batants, United States, United Kingdom, Italy, and Japan ratified the
treaty; France rejected it.
As World War II approached, the United States and United King-
dom continued to view superior orders as a complete defense to a
subordinate's war crimes. In the 1929 edition of her land warfare
manual, the United Kingdom baldly stated:
106. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES
150 (1963).
107. Id. at 152.
108. See, e.g., Hans Kelsen, Collective and Individual Responsibili" in Interna-
tional Law With Particular Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals, 31 CAL.
L. REv. 530, 538 (1943) (explaining that the demand for punishment for war
criminals means making the individuals responsible by punishing them for acts
committed by themselves or for acts committed at their command or with their
authorization); OPPENHEIM, supra note 61, at 23-70; HERSCH LAUTERPACHT,
DIsPuTES, WAR AND NEUTRALITY 453-56 (6th ed. 1944) (discussing the contro-
versy surrounding limiting individual liability for war crimes).
109. See Treaty Relative to the Protection of the Lives of Neutrals and Noncom-
batants at Sea in Time of War and to Prevent the Use of Noxious Gases and
Chemicals, Feb. 6, 1922, U.S.-U.K.-Fr.-Italy-Japan, TREATIES, CONVEN rIONS,
INTERNATIONAL ACTS, PROTOCOLS, AND AGREEMENTS BE'm.%EEN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER POWERS, VOL. II (1910-23) 3116.
110. Id. at3118.
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It is important, however, to note that members of the armed forces who
commit such violations of the recognized rules of warfare as are ordered
by their Government or by their commander are not war criminals and
cannot therefore be punished by the enemy. He may punish the officials
or commanders responsible for such orders if they fall into his
hands .... "'
The manual did not detail how injured states that employ a more
strict standard, such as Germany, might view its asserted prohibition
on punishing British subjects they held as prisoners.
In 1934, the United States published a new edition of the Rules oJ
Land Warfare ("Rules of Land Warfare IT')."' Paragraph 352 of the
Rules of Land Warfare II, which addressed superior orders, did not
vary from the original Rules of Land Warfare. The failure of the
Rules of Land Warfare II's index to even include a "superior orders"
entry illustrates the degree of concern that the new edition paid the
issue. A soldier's law of war offenses remained fully exempt from
prosecution if the soldier committed the crime pursuant to the order
of a superior. There was no qualification that the order must have
been reasonable, legal, or one within the authority of the superior.
F. WORLD WAR II: AN OLD NEW STANDARD
In 1940, with World War II already raging in Europe, the United
States followed its 1934 manual with yet another version. This ver-
sion added a military nomenclature, FM 27-10 to the original title
Rules of Land Warfare. The new edition's Paragraph 347 on superior
orders merely replicated the 1914 and 1934 standards.
By now the more optimistic officials among the Allies were al-
ready considering the possibility of eventually punishing Axis lead-
ers for their roles in the war; not only their senior leadership who
initiated the war, but also those who might have committed battle-
field war crimes. As early as 1942, the Allies announced that they
I 11. J.E. EDMONDS & LASSA OPPENHEIM, LAND WARFARE: AN EXPOSITION OF
THE LAWS AND USAGES OF WAR ON LAND FOR THE GUIDANCE OF OFFICERS OF HIS
MAJESTY'S ARMY 95 (1929) (delineating military laws and procedures in effect
and applicable to the United Kingdom).
112. See WELLS, supra note 59, at 8 (describing the 1934 edition of the Rules of
Land Warfare and the international political climate necessitating the changes from
the 1914 edition).
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would prosecute German and Japanese soldiers for obeying improper
orders and to deny them the opportunity to plead the superior orders
defense."3 Such a stance, however, clearly required a reevaluation of
United States policy as reflected in its Field Manual."' While the Al-
lies did not want to repeat the results of the Leipzig Trials, the United
States could not continue to sponsor the defense it intended to deny
the vanquished enemy.
In 1906, Oppenheim's hzternational Law was instrumental in es-
tablishing the prevailing Anglo-American military standard of liabil-
ity for obedience to illegal superior orders." Through the years, suc-
ceeding editions of his work, which the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia refers to as the opus classicum
on international law, ' 6 continued to exert their considerable influence
among international legal authorities. The Sixth Edition was pub-
lished in 1940, edited by Professor Hersch Lauterpacht in place of
the then-deceased Oppenheim." 7 In it, Lauterpacht made a significant
amendment. Regarding the responsibility of soldiers for battlefield
war crimes pursuant to superior orders, Lauterpacht suggested a re-
version to the pre-1906 military standard, while at the same time
distancing himself from the standard that his predecessor's work had
been instrumental in establishing:
The fact that a rule of warfare has been violated in pursuance of an order
... of an individual belligerent commander does not deprive the act in
question of its character as a war crime; neither does it, in principle, con-
fer upon the perpetrator immunity from punishment by the injured bellig-
erent. A different view has occasionally been adopted by writers, but it is
difficult to regard it as expressing a sound legal principle." 
"
Did the fact that Lauterpacht's native Great Britain was engaged in
113. See id. at 24 (describing the need for changes to the 1944 edition of the
Rules of Land Warfare).
114. See id.
115. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 61, at 264-65.
116. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, 111 I.L.M. 298 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia, App. Chamber, 1997).
117. See LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: DISPLTES, WAR AND
NEUTRALrrY 453-54 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 1940).
118. Id.
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mortal struggle with an enemy soon to face the criminal bar have an
influence on this new stance, making this a sort of anticipatory vic-
tor's justice? Or, was it merely recognition of the validity of criticism
that commentators had long leveled against the prior position? It
probably was the latter. 9 Lauterpacht noted the incongruity of dif-
fering civil and military standards,' 0 found that subordinate immu-
nity was simply "at variance with the corresponding principles of
English criminal and constitutional law," and argued, therefore, that
it was not a sound principle of law.12' Lauterpacht's position merely
reflected the changing and maturing international law, as well as the
withering of the Act of State Doctrine, with the concomitant ripening
of personal responsibility for wrongful acts in the world arena.
Other factors were also coalescing to create a newly-unified ap-
proach to the punishment of battlefield war crimes. The London In-
ternational Assembly, created in 1941 under the aegis of the League
of Nations, began studying post-war problems and designing a
framework for establishing the United Nations. 22 The issue of retri-
bution for World War II war crimes was high on the Assembly's
agenda. Later, nine states of the Assembly issued the St. James Dec-
laration of 1942, a precursor of the London Agreement that estab-
119. But see MARK P. OSIEL, OBEYING ORDERS: ATROCITY, MILITARY
DISCIPLINE & THE LAW OF WAR 58 (1999) (observing that "[tlhe decline of re-
spondeat superior in... military penal codes of most nations has been less a result
of logic than of painful experience"). Osiel continues to argue that "[i]t was the
historical experience of Nazi war crimes, conducted under superior orders, that led
national and international legislators to reassess" the United States position. Id.
120. See generally Neu v. McCarthy, 33 N.E.2d 570, 573 (Mass. 1941) (holding
that a person who enters military service is not thereby relieved from his obligation
to observe the laws of the jurisdiction in which he finds himself); State v. Roy, 64
S.E.2d 840 (N.C. 1951) (holding that alleged command of defendant's sergeant to
commit an assault on a female would not relieve the defendant from criminal re-
sponsibility due to the order's obvious illegality). "It is an interesting gloss on the
complexity of the problem that in Great Britain and in the United States the plea of
superior orders is, on the whole, without decisive effect in internal criminal or con-
stitutional law, although it is apparently treated as a full justification in relation to
war crimes .... Lauterpacht, supra note 24, at 72-73.
121. See Lauterpacht, supra note 24, at 69 n.2 (noting Lauterpacht's disagree-
ment with both the British and American manuals that allow Act of State doctrine
as a shield to war crime charges).
122. See HISTORY OF THE U.N. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 266.
[15:481
THE LAW OF WAR
lished the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal.'2'
The London International Assembly in turn created the Interna-
tional Commission for Penal Reconstruction and Development, in
part to study rules and procedures to govern eventual war crimes
prosecutions.' 24 Professor Lauterpacht submitted a persuasive memo-
randum to the Commission that corresponded to his revised Interna-
tional Law position and urged that the defense of obedience to supe-
rior orders only be available to an accused who could make out a
case of compulsion.'2 The manifest illegality of an order would pre-
clude the defense entirely.'26 "The rules of warfare," Lauterpacht
wrote, "like any other rules of international law, are binding not upon
impersonal entities, but upon human beings .... '"" Personal crimi-
nal responsibility for battlefield war crimes remained the goal.
Agreeing, the Commission also urged a definitive and formal end to
the Act of State Doctrine, which might otherwise protect Axis lead-
ers as political agents of their states by granting them immunity from
prosecution.,8
In January 1944, the newly formed United Nations War Crimes
Commission took up the issue of obedience to orders. Unlike its
stance after World War I, the United States now was squarely behind
a recommendation that the defense be rejected: "[t]he plea of supe-
rior orders shall not constitute a defense. .. if the order was so mani-
festly contrary to the laws of war that a person of ordinary sense and
understanding would know or should know... that an order was il-
legal." 29 In an ironic role reversal, however, the Commission could
123. See id. (pointing out that the head of state doctrine would be no shield to
prosecution).
124. See id. (noting lessons learned regarding war crimes prosecution from
World War I).
125. See id.
126. See Kelsen, supra note 108, at 557-58 ("According to the law of some
States, the plea of superior command can be rejected only if the command was
manifestly and indisputably contrary to law"). Kelsen notes that it is a very rare
case indeed where the command is "universally known to everybody, including the
accused, to be without any doubt whatever against the law." Id.
127. HISToRY OF THE U.N. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 266-67.
128. See id. at 266.
129. Id. at 278.
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not reach agreement on this issue due to the varied practice and laws
of its member states. Declaring it futile to attempt formulation of an
absolute rule, the Commission ultimately recommended that the va-
lidity of the plea of superior orders be left to national courts, "ac-
cording to their own views of the merits and limits of the plea."1
Despite this failure to reach Allied agreement, the stage was set for
basic change in the America's superior orders doctrine, which was
not long in coming.
In April 1944, in a striking development, the United Kingdom re-
vised its manual, adopting almost word-for-word Lauterpacht's lan-
guage in his Sixth Edition of International Law. That modification
represented, of course, a complete volte-face. Seven months later, on
November 15, 1944, the United States similarly reversed and revised
its Field Manual. The United States change affirmed the ideal that
courts would now consider not only individuals, but also organiza-
tions and high government officials, culpable for law of war of-
fenses:
Individuals and organizations who violate the accepted laws and customs
of war may be punished there for. However, the fact that the acts com-
plained of were done pursuant to order of a superior or government sanc-
tion may be taken into consideration in determining culpability, either by
way of defense or in mitigation of punishment. The person giving such
orders may also be punished. I3
As before 1914, obedience to a superior's orders was no longer an
automatic and complete defense. This paragraph was the sole change
in the new 1944 manual.
France, to be consistent with her allies, made a similar change to
her law of war manual, as did Canada. The Soviet approach re-




131. UNITED STATES ARMY, FM 27-10, FIELD MANUAL: RULES OF LAND
WARFARE para. 345(1) (1944) (reflecting change from 1940 version following ex-
ecutive decision on November 15, 1944).
132. See MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 491
(1959) (explaining that under Soviet Russian military law, a soldier carrying out
the unlawful order of an officer incurs no responsibility for the crime; the officer
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Throughout World War II, Nazi Germany professed an opposition
to the defense of superior orders, adhering to the standard only re-
discovered by the United States and Britain in 1944. Early that year,
after German mobs murdered captured Allied pilots, Nazi Propa-
ganda Minister Joseph Goebbels explicitly attempted to justify the
murders by condemning the plea of superior orders as inadmissible
in contemporary international law.' 3 In the German newspaper Det-
sche Allgemeine Zeitung, Goebbels wrote that "[n]o international law
of warfare is in existence which provides that a soldier who has
committed a mean crime can escape punishment by pleading as his
defense that he followed the commands of his superiors."" In the of-
ficial Nazi newspaper, Volkisher Beobachter, Goebbels wrote that
"[t]he [Allied] pilots cannot validly claim that as soldiers they
obeyed orders... if these orders are in striking opposition to all hu-
man ethics, to all international customs in the conduct of war.'"
Throughout the war, the Wel rinacit-UUntersuchrngsstelle fir
Verletzungen des Vdlkerrechts (Bureau for the Investigation of War
Crimes) was an active unit of the Nazi Army. Ironically, knowing all
that we do about Nazi practices in Russia and other conquered terri-
tories, the Bureau regularly gathered evidence for the court-martial
of Nazi soldiers charged with war crimes and, reportedly, death sen-
tences often resulted.
36
Nazi battlefield excesses are often recalled, and rightly so. It bears
repeating, however, that war crimes are not limited to the other side.
World War H, like all wars before and after, was violent, brutal, and
often unmindful of legal restrictions. Two examples of United States
war crimes are illustrative of this point.
On June, 27, 1943, General George S. Patton spoke to the officers
does incur responsibility).
133. See HISTORY OF THE U.N. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 288
(explaining that Goebbels, as a top-ranking Nazi leader, was personally responsible
for many war crimes).
134. Id. (citing Goebbels' statement).
135. See GREENSPAN, supra note 132, at 442 (quoting Goebbels' justification for
the slaying of Allied pilots by mobs of Germans).
136. See ALFRED M. DE ZAYAS, THE WEHRMACHT WAR CRIMES BLREAU,
1939-1945, 10 (1989) (providing numerous examples of Nazi convictions and
punishments for war crimes committed during World War I11).
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and enlisted men of his 45th Infantry Division just prior to their inva-
sion of Sicily. In his remarks he said, "[a]ttack rapidly, ruthlessly, vi-
ciously and without rest, and kill even civilians who have the stupid-
ity to fight us." 3 7 According to defense lawyers, he also exhorted, "if
the enemy resisted until we got to within 200 yards, he had forfeited
his rights to live."'38 In heavy fighting only a few days later, a captain
of the 45th Infantry Division lined up forty-three captured Germans
and directed their execution by machine gun.
During the same invasion, a sergeant murdered thirty-six German
prisoners he was escorting to the rear. At their courts-martial, con-
vened by Patton, both soldiers raised as their defense the "orders" is-
sued by Patton in his pre-invasion speech.'3 9 Subsequent inquiries
into Patton's remarks exonerated the general. 4 Although the military
court convicted both the captain and the sergeant, their trials illus-
trate that it was not only Nazis who appreciated the defense of supe-
rior orders, or who were willing to employ it to their advantage as a
legal defense-or smoke screen.
An even more troubling event involved United States Navy Com-
mander Dudley W. Morton, commander of the submarine USS Wa-
hoo (SS-238). During a January 1943 patrol, Morton's submarine
surfaced after having sunk a troop-carrying freighter. The sea was
filled with Japanese survivors-probably more than a thousand.
Morton seemed determined, regardless of the number of survivors, to
ensure that he killed all of them.' 4' He ordered the submarine's sail-
ors to fire the deck guns and machine guns on enemy lifeboats and
survivors in the water, which his sailors did, for more than an hour.
The Wahoo's second-in-command, Richard O'Kane, later a rear ad-
137. Aubrey M. Daniel, III, The Defense of Superior Orders, 7 U. RICH. L. REV.
477, 498-99 (1973) (discussing the standard to which military leaders are held in
decision making and issuing orders).
138. LADISLAS FARAGO, PATTON: ORDEAL AND TRIUMPH 415 (1963) (quoting
excerpts from Patton's prepared remarks to his men before the invasion of Sicily).
139. See L.C. GREEN, SUPERIOR ORDERS IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 131 (1976) (detailing the defense strategy of those men court-martialed for
premeditated murder).
140. See FARAGO, supra note 138, at 415-16.
141. See CLAY BLAIR, JR., SILENT VICTORY 384 (1975) (detailing the account of
Dudley Morton and his order to machinegun swimming Japanese sailors and sol-
diers after his submarine had sunk their troop transport).
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miral and Medal of Honor holder, reported that "Wahoo's fire ...
was methodical, the small guns sweeping from abeam forward like
fire hoses cleaning a street .... Some Japanese troops were un-
doubtedly hit during this action, but no individual was deliberately
shot in the boats or in the sea.', 42 By the time the Wahoo sailors had
finished firing, the boats were nothing more than flotsam.'4 '
Upon return to Pearl Harbor, the United States Navy lauded the
Wahoo with a Presidential Unit Citation and presented Morton with a
Navy Cross. In his patrol report, Morton freely described the killing
of the hundreds of survivors of the sunken transport. Although this
constituted murder to many fellow submariners, the United States
never raised any question of Morton's order.'" Morton's order to fire
on survivors appears identical to that of the World War I sub com-
mander, Helmuth Patzig, whom the Leipzig Court sought as a war
criminal. The Leipzig Court had convicted Patzig's subordinates,
Dithmar and Boldt, of acts similar to Morton's, yet Morton not only
escaped punishment but was honored for his acts.
Excuses that "the defeat of the Axis required the use of force in a
fashion that more squeamish times-when the fundamental survival
of the West was less directly threatened-have been found repug-
nant"' 45 and may state a popular political truth. Such excuses, how-
ever, fail to take into account the law of war that all nations are
obliged to observe.
By war's end, neither Nazi Germany nor Imperial Japan was in a
position to charge enemies with battlefield war crimes, although the
United States was. In October, 1945, the United States began its first
World War II war crimes trial, that of General Tomoyuki Yamashita,
142. RICHARD H. O'KANE, WAHOO 154 (1987) (describing the scene of de-
struction involving the Japanese survival boats).
143. See id.
144. See BLAIR, supra note 141, at 386 (revealing the lack of response by the
High Command to Morton's slaughter of Japanese survivors); see also SAMUEL
ELLIOT MORRISON, 5 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS IN
WORLD WAR II 256 (1949) (telling how, during the naval battle of Guadalcanal,
seamen on the tug Boblink machine-gunned Japanese survivors in the water).
145. Williamson Murray, The Meaning of World War 1I, 8 JOINT FORCES
QUARTERLY 50, 54 (1995) (emphasis in original) (explaining the justification for
atrocities when at war).
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commander of the defeated Japanese forces in Manila. The issue of
superior orders did not arise directly in the course of Yamashita's
trial before a military commission of five Army general officers.
Later, however, Supreme Court Justice Frank Murphy, in a passion-
ate and oft-quoted dissent from the Court's opinion involving Yama-
shita's conviction, noted that individual criminal responsibility lies
not only in those who commit battlefield war crimes, but those who
order them as well. 146 Justice Murphy's affirmation of the 1944 Rules
of Land Warfare standard, and the responsibility of commanders who
order war crimes, differed little from Chief Justice Marshall's 1804
opinion regarding United States Navy Captain George Little. 47 The
Yamashita case would resonate beyond the Far East International
Military Tribunal,1 48 and even into the Vietnam War and the cases of
Lieutenant Calley and Captain Medina 49 of My Lai infamy.
G. THE NUREMBERG IMT: THE "NEW" STANDARD APPLIED
The Nuremberg International Military Tribunal's ("IMT") proce-
dural rules were a product of the St. James Declaration of 1942, the
146. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 38 (1945) (defining the Court's interpre-
tation of international rules of war for purposes of the defendant's petition for ha-
beas corpus). An interesting case recently before the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces is United States v. Rockwood, 48 M.J. 501 (A.C.C.A. 1998), which
invokes Yamashita. One of the arguments of Captain Rockwood, who the United
States charged with disobedience of orders, is that international law affirmatively
required him, like Yamashita before him, "to act to prevent the loss of life."
Rockwood's conviction was affirmed.
147. See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) (refusing to exonerate
Little for his crime on his claim that he was following the orders of President Ad-
ams).
148. See B.V.A. ROLING, Introduction, in THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL 15,
17 (C. Hosoya et al. eds., 1986) (detailing the death sentence of Hirota Koki under
the reasoning that he shared responsibility for the rape of Nanking).
149. See Colonel William G. Eckhardt, Command Criminal Responsibility: A
Plea for a Workable Strategy, 97 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1982) (explaining that, although
the court found Captain Medina not responsible for the murders committed by his
men, the court had misapplied the standard to determine his responsibility). The
standard for conviction of a superior officer for acts committed by a subordinate
was whether the superior officer knew or should have known that his failure to
control his subordinates would result in criminal acts. See id. The prosecutor in
Medina's case acknowledged that the court had applied the wrong standard when
the court directed that it must base a conviction on a commander's actual knowl-
edge of his subordinates' crimes. See id. (emphasis added).
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Moscow Declaration of 1943, and, more directly, the London
Agreement of August 1945. Relying upon the reports and recom-
mendations of the United Nations War Crimes Commission, the
London Agreement set the ground rules for the trial in the Tribunal's
Charter, which, among other things, specified war crimes as acts
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.""
Article 8 of the IMT's Charter embodied the change initiated by
Professor Lauterpacht four and-a-half years before, and incorporated
in the Rules of Land Watfare less than nine months earlier. Article 8
read: "[t]he fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of his
Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility,
but may be considered in mitigation of punishment .... ."" The IMT
intended to hold the Nazis criminally responsible for war crimes they
committed, and for war crimes they ordered. Obedience to superior
orders would be no shield. "The fundamental principle involved: the
criminal responsibility of individuals .... '": As the IMT famously
noted in reference to war crimes, "[c]rimes against international law
are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punish-
ing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of inter-
national law be enforced."
' 53
In anticipation of the trial of the Nazis, the Allies had reverted
their law regarding the superior orders defense to the pre-1914 stan-
dard, which had applied all along in German courts-martial and
American civil courts. The Anglo-American legal detour had lasted
thirty years, but the IMT seemingly brought the soldiers' legal de-
fense full circle: a law of war violation pursuant to a superior's mani-
festly illegal order remained a war crime. That construct was the law
applied at Nuremberg and, as Professor Geoffrey Best points out:
150. TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF TIlE ARMY ON
THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10
(1949).
151. International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before
the IT, Vol. I, 10, 12 (1947) (being the official text of the IMT in English, this
volume contains the documents and initial motions considered by the IMT).
152. U.N., The Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal: History and
Analysis (NY: UNGA, 1949) 39.
153. TRIALS OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 41 (1946), quoted in
BROWNLIE, supra note 106, at 154 (arguing that collective sanctions against a
country to combat war crimes is an ineffective method of charging behavior).
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No element of Nuremberg legislation was more single-mindedly ad-
hered to than this one, the emphatic assertion of individual responsi-
bility .... Command responsibility is bracketed with superior orders
for obvious enough reasons. If servicemen are to be brought to trial
for carrying out unlawful and atrocious orders, do not logic and eq-
uity demand that their superiors must be brought to trial for issuing
the same?
5 4
Still, it is not entirely correct to assert that, "[t]he IMT Charter...
eliminated the defense of superior orders."'55 As single-mindedly as
the IMT Charter may have applied the element as to senior officers
and officials, the IMT nevertheless did inject an ameliorating factor
not suggested by a strict interpretation of the Charter: "The True
Test." The IMT explained that the True Test was the inquiry not of
whether there was "the existence of the [manifestly illegal] order, but
whether moral choice was in fact possible."' 56
International law has not adhered even to Nuremberg's diluted
formulation. The superior orders defense is alive and still used when
the questioned conduct is not clearly and obviously criminal.', As
Hilaire McCoubrey points out, even after Nuremberg, superior orders
is a valid defense anytime the order concerned was not obviously
unlawful to the subordinate.'58 Later, even the framers of the 1949
154. GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945, 190 (1994) (offering logical
reasoning for criminal prosecution of officers when they have ordered that unlaw-
ful acts be committed).
155. STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (1997) (explaining that the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal Charter created individual accountability and removed
various defenses from the judicial sphere).
156. UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, 4 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS 411(1947-49) (noting that the True Test was the articulation of
a doctrine existing "in varying degrees in the criminal law of most nations").
157. See OSIEL, supra note 119, at 97 (offering justification for countries main-
taining the superior orders defense). In many countries, people have preconceived
loyalties to tribes, clans, and faiths. To allow criminal punishment for following
commands of a superior only further weakens the frail system they already have.
See id.
158. See HILAIRE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: THE
REGULATION OF ARMED CONFLICTS 221 (1990) (concluding that today, despite
rulings otherwise, the defense of superior orders potentially remains anytime an
order given is not clearly illegal).
516 [15:481
THE LAW OF WAR
Geneva Conventions declined to directly incorporate the prohibition
of Nuremberg's Article 8.
H. NUREMBERG'S "SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS"
Following the IMT, the United States initiated a series of war
crimes trials held in its sector of Berlin, as did the French, British
and Russians in their sectors. Referred to as "the Subsequent Pro-
ceedings" because they followed the IMT in purpose and method, the
Allies based the trials upon a 1945 Joint Chiefs of Staff directive""
and incorporated procedure that generally paralleled the IMT's pro-
cedures and rules. The Subsequent Proceedings' implementing di-
rective was Control Council Law Number 10, a reference to the Al-
lied Council that oversaw the governing of Berlin. Eventually
totaling twelve trials, the Subsequent Proceedings tried an aggregate
of 191 high-ranking military and civilian Nazis.
In language essentially identical to IMT Charter Article 8, the
Subsequent Proceedings' Article 11.4(b) read: "[t]he fact that any
person acted pursuant to the order of... a superior does not free him
from responsibility for a crime, but may be considered in mitiga-
tion." Brigadier General Telford Taylor, the Chief Prosecutor opined:
The major legal significance of the [Control Council] Law No. 10 judge-
ment lies, in my opinion, in those portions of the judgements dealing with
the area of personal responsibility for international law crimes. The tribu-
nal had to determine whether the plea of 'duress' or 'superior orders' was
genuine... and, if the plea was found to be bona fide, to what extent it
should be given weight in defense or mitigation. 16
The "moral test," which effectively modified the IMT's Article 8
by ameliorating its blanket rejection of superior orders as a defense,
also affected the Subsequent Proceedings Article II.4.(b), and led to a
required showing of duress as a necessary part of a successful de-
fense of superior orders.' 6' Therefore, despite Article 8 and Article
159. See TAYLOR, supra note 150, at 2-10 (describing directive and its origins).
The directive establishes a definition of war crimes that includes offenses that vio-
late common justice or moral turpitude. See id. at 2; see also id. at 247-48 (pro-
viding draft of the directive regarding war crimes).
160. Id. at 109-10 (emphasis in original).
161. See Erdemovic, supra note 116, at 25-27 ("As obedience to superior orders
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II.4.(b), the tribunal continued to apply a limited responsibility doc-
trine."' The consideration of the "moral choice" test is apparent in
the Subsequent Proceedings' Flick'63 and Farben64 judgments while,
in the High Command cases, the tribunal noted that the law must al-
low a solider to assume that orders conform to international law. 161
Still, some Nazis never did understand. In the course of the IMT's
General Staff prosecution, when asked about the legality of orders,
Schutzstaffel General Otto Ohlendorf declared that subordinates had
sworn obedience to their superiors and therefore could not even con-
ceive of questioning the legality of orders, thus he could not under-
stand these orders being challenged by the tribunal.' 6  As General
Taylor commented such a stance was taking the defense of superior
orders to the extreme.6 7 The tribunal subsequently convicted Ohlen-
dorf and he was hanged.
Although finding the presence of moral choice in many cases, the
tribunal strictly applied Article 8 of the Charter in many cases, in-
may be considered merely as a factual element in determining whether duress is
made out on the facts, the absence of a superior order does not mean that duress as
a defense must fail .... ").
162. See Nico KEIJZER, THE MILITARY DUTY TO OBEY 212 (1977) (explaining
that the limited responsibility seems to be a more fair approach to prosecution,
considering that the tribunal was composed of judges from victorious nations and
only enemy nations were on trial).
163. See VI T.W.C. BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MIL. TRIBS. 1197-98 (1952)
(commenting on the Flick case). The tribunal noted that, because "[q]uotas for
production were set for industry by the Reich ... [t]he defendants were justified in
their fear that the Reich authorities would take drastic action" and join the work
program that participated in criminal activity. Id.
164. See VIII T.W.C. BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MIL. TRIBS. 11 75 (1952) (com-
menting on Farben case). The tribunal stated that it was "not prepared to say that
these defendants did not speak the truth when they asserted that in conforming to
the slave-labor program they had no other choice than to comply . I..." d  In light
of the tribunal's finding that the defendants executed a moral choice, the longest
sentence issued was eight years with credit for time served. See id. at 1206-09.
165. See XI T.W.C. BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MIL. TRIBS. 511 (1950).
166. TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIAL 248 (1992)
(quoting Ohlendorf's testimony that the atrocious acts committed by the Nazi
Schutzstaffel were done only in obedience to orders issued from commanders).
167. See id. Taylor stated "Befehl ist befehl," which translates to: "orders are
orders."
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cluding the Pelius Case,'6' the Scuttled U-Boats Case,"' and the Al-
melo, 70 Dostler, 7 1and Belsen' " cases. In each trial, the tribunal held
that superior orders did not exonerate subordinates from personal re-
sponsibility for their war crimes.
On the other hand, some tribunals in effect held that, if a subordi-
nate did not know and could not be expected to know that the order
he carried out was illegal, nens rea was lacking and the subordinate
was not guilty. This reflection of today's United States military stan-
dard is seen, for example in the Hostage"" and Einsatsgruppen'
cases. The Hostage Case Tribunal wrote:
If the act done pursuant to a superior's order be murder, the production of
the order will not make it any less so. It may mitigate but it cannot justify
the crime. We are of the view, however, that if the illegality of the order
was not known to the inferior, and he could not reasonably have been ex-
pected to know of its illegality, no wrongful intent necessary to the com-
mission of the crime exists and the inferior will be protected.
168. The Peleus Trial (Trial of Eck, et al.) (1945), Brit. Mil. Ct., Hamburg,
Germany, WCT Series, vol. I.
169. In re Grumpelt, reprinted in ANNUAL DIGEST AND REPORTS OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LA\V CASES, 309 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 1951) (charging a German
Navy officer with the scuttling of two submarines).
170. In re Sandarac, et al., reprinted ini ANNUAL DIGEST AND REPORTS OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES 297 (H. Lauterpacht, ed., 1951) (charging
four German non-commissioned officers with killing a British prisoner of war).
171. In re Dostler, reprinted in ANNUAL DIGEST AND REPORTS OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES, 280 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 1951 )(charging a German
Army Commander with the execution of fifteen United States prisoners of war).
172. The Belsen Trial (Trial of Kramer et al.) (1945), Brit. Mil. Ct., Germany,
WCT Series, vol. II.
173. See XI T.W.C. BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 1236
(1950) [hereinafter Hostage Case] (commenting on the Hostage Case).
174. See IV T.W.C. BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 470 (1949)
[hereinafter Einsatsgruppen Case] (commenting on the Einsatsgruppen case and
explaining limitations of superior orders defense).
175. Hostage Case, supra note 180, at 1236; see also Einsatsgruppen Case, sit-
pra note 181, at 470-71 (applying similar interpretation of superior orders de-
fense).
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II. MANIFEST ILLEGALITY: CONTINUING
INTERPRETIVE DIFFICULTY
Understandably, legal systems, including the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, rarely define "manifest illegality" with any preci-
sion.' Whether a subordinate's act, or a superior's order, is mani-
festly illegal is an objective question. Would a reasonable person
recognize the wrongfulness of the act or order? "In short, where
wrongfulness [of an order] is clear, you must disobey, but you must
resolve all genuine doubts about wrongfulness in favor of obedi-
ence." 77 In an ambivalent situation, the reviewing court must resolve
any uncertainty as to whether the conduct or order was manifestly
illegal in favor of the defendant, for "the whole point of the rule is
that no 'reasoning why' is necessary to discern the wrongfulness of
an order immediately displaying its criminality on its face.",
78
This is not the same as a soldier disobeying an order based upon
the asserted illegality of his nation'sjus ad bellum resort to the use of
force.' 9 Moreover, a service person's conscience, religious beliefs,
moral judgement, or personal philosophy cannot justify or excuse the
disobedience of an otherwise lawful order.'8 Manifest illegality is the
standard.
How does a court recognize an order to commit a manifestly ille-
gal act? An 1867 New York case characterized such an order as "so
176. See OSIEL, supra note 119, at 77. The German Military Penal Code is one
of the few that attempts a definition. It offers that "illegality is manifest when it is
contrary 'to what every man's conscience would tell him anyhow."' Id. (quoting
HANNAH AREN'T, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM 293 (1962)).
177. Id. at 84 (noting that this broad reading of the manifest illegality rule did
not survive the modem era).
178. Id. at 115 (stating that illegality of the order must be obvious in a way that
is pre-reflective).
179. See United States v. Huet-Vaughn, 43 M.J. 105, 114-15 (C.A.A.F. 1995)
(holding that, in the context of Operation Desert Storm, this argument was a non-
justiciable political question). The Huet-Vaughn Court held that the duty to dis-
obey an unlawful order applies only to "a positive act that constitutes a crime [that
is] so manifestly beyond the legal power or discretion of the commander as to ad-
mit of no rational doubt of their unlawfulness." Id. at 107.
180. See IV MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL § 14c(2)(a)(iii) (1995); see also
United States v. Kabat, 979 F.2d 580 (8th Cir. 1986) (rejecting moral, religious,
and political beliefs as a defense for criminal acts).
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palpably atrocious as well as illegal that one ought instinctively feel
that it ought not to be obeyed.... ."' Two examples are Lieutenant
Calley's order to kill unarmed women and children during the Viet-
nam War,'2 and a Korean War case involving an order to rape and
steal.lu The Court of Military Appeals has found manifestly illegal
an Army Specialist Four's order to a private to continue driving a
truck on which the brakes were not working properly.' ' One com-
mentator explained the ramifications of the rule:
The manifest illegality rule thus imposes a broad duty to obey superior
orders that is qualified by an equally bright-line duty to disobey orders to
commit atrocities. The general rule's extreme leniency is redressed, in
part, by the exception's extreme stringency .... The objective is to elimi-
nate anypossibility of doubt about what one should do in any given
situation.5
The rule, of course, covers only the easier cases. Where the order
presents a doubtful case, the subordinate should obey the order, since
its illegality is not manifest.
A. MERE EVIDENCE OR COMPLETE DEFENSE? MISTAKE OF LAW
OR MISTAKE OF FACT?
What of the legal practitioner's viewpoint? At trial, the assertion
that a soldier acted in obedience to superior orders is either no more
than an admissible fact showing that he mistakenly believed his con-
181. McCall v. McDowell, 15 F. Cas. 1235, 1241 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867) (No.
8,673) (stating that this is a practical and just rule).
182. See Eckhardt, supra note 149.
183. United States v. Kinder, 14 C.M.R. 742, 775 (A.C.M. 1953).
184. See United States v. Cherry, 22 M.J. 284, 286 (C.M.A. 1986). There are
several cases that have found orders to be overbroad, vague, and incapable of be-
ing obeyed. Compare United States v. Milldebrandt, 25 C.M.R. 139, 141 (C.M.A.
1958) (holding that the order was so all-inclusive as to be unenforceable), and
United States v. Wysong, 26 C.M.R. 29, 31 (C.M.A. 1958) (noting that the orders'
vagueness and indefiniteness were defects), and United States v. Green, 22 M.J.
711, 719 (A.C.M.R 1986) (finding the order unenforceable due to its arbitrariness
and unreasonableness), with United States v. Dykes, 6 M.J. 744, 748 (N.C.M.R.
1978) (holding that the order was not an unreasonable deprivation of a right).
185. OSIEL, supra note 119, at 287 (stating that this military law approach sig-
nificantly contributes to the "central human experience of soldiering").
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duct lawful, or a defense in its own right. As we have seen, the
United States took the position that obedience to orders is a complete
legal defense only for a brief historical period. Today, obedience to
orders remains a complete defense in some Third World countries,
where governments favor unqualified obedience to authority.
In modem United States practice, however, obedience to orders
remains a defense in and of itself, but only if the accused can show
that she reasonably believed the orders she acted upon were lawful." 6
The soldier who raises the defense may assert that she carried out an
illegal order while mistaken as to a fact relevant to the order. For ex-
ample, pursuant to her squadron commander's order, a pilot may fire
her munitions at a hospital, knowing that international law protects
hospitals, but mistakenly believing her commander's assurance that
the enemy employs this hospital as an anti-aircraft gun position. The
pilot may successfully assert a defense of mistake of fact. Her squad-
ron commander, of course, will have to contend with his own
charges.
Similarly, a soldier may assert that he carried out an illegal order
while mistaken as to the law involved. An artilleryman may fire on a
museum upon receiving orders to do so, knowing the target to be a
museum, but believing it to be a lawful target. Thus, the artilleryman
may successfully assert mistake of law as his defense.
Finally, it is possible, if unlikely, to raise the defense of obedience
to superior orders by asserting a mixed mistake of law and fact. Pur-
suant to orders, a soldier may fire on a school occupied by children,
believing the children are lawful targets because they have recently
fired on him or his comrades. If in actuality the solider or his com-
rades have not received fire from the school, he may assert the de-
fense of mistake of fact; the children, having never engaged in offen-
sive activity, would remain unlawful targets, and the solider may
assert the defense of mistake of law.
186. See UNITED STATES ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND
WARFARE 182 (1956) [hereinafter FIELD MANUAL 27-10] (noting that in cases
where the court deems the order to not constitute a defense to a war crime allega-
tion, the court may consider that the individual was acting pursuant to orders in
mitigation of punishment).
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B. OBEDIENCE To ORDERS: ELSEWHERE
AND LATER
The Tokyo International Military Tribunal Charter's Article 6(b),
as well as Paragraph 16 of American Regulations Governing the
Trial of War Criminals in the Pacific Area, were similar to the Nur-
emberg IMT's Article 8. As happened at Nuremberg, the Tokyo tri-
bunal rejected pleas of superior orders.' 1 The tribunals for prosecu-
tion of war crimes in the Pacific and the Mediterranean also
employed similar procedural articles.'
Soviet law rejected superior orders, both as a defense and as miti-
gation of war crimes. German military law rejects superior orders as
a defense, although German civilian criminal law allows it.' Den-
mark and Norway excuse the soldier who disobeys lawful orders that
he reasonably believes to be illegal.'"
Negotiations during the formulation of the 1977 Protocols to the
1949 Geneva Conventions illustrated that the Communist Bloc and
many Third World states, wishing to maximize compliance with of-
ficial directives, offered their soldiers full immunity when they obey
unlawful orders, even if they cannot demonstrate that they mistak-
enly believed that the orders were lawfrul.'' Despite lengthy negotia-
tions to draft a provision limiting the defense of superior orders, the
effort was unsuccessful due to objections by African and Asian
states. 92
187. In re Masuda, et al., reprinted in ANNUAL DIGEST AND REPORTS OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES, 286 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 1951) (charging a Rear-
Admiral and subordinate officers in the Japanese Navy with killing three American
airmen).
188. See HISTORY OF THE U.N. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, supra note 6, at 283
(describing the provisions in the American regulations for the trial of war crimes
issued by the United States Army headquarters for the Mediterranean Theatre of
Operations and the similarity of the American regulations governing the trial of
war criminals in the Pacific area).
189. See WAR CRIMES: REPORT OF THE WAR CRIMES INQUIRY, supra note 80, at
66-67.
190. See KEIJZER, supra note 162, at 106.
191. See generally HOWARD S. LEVIE, PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS:
PROTOCOL I TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS 10-44 (Supp. 1985) (recounting
the negotiations surrounding several of the more contentious Protocol I Articles).
192. See Colonel Howard S. Levie, The Rise and Fall of an lnternationalv
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The trials before the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICT")
have seen the ancient defense of superior orders raised, demonstrat-
ing its enduring vitality, although the ICT's articles specifically re-
ject it.' 93 The ICT made clear, however, that, although not strictly a
defense, obedience to orders can be relevant and an admissible
fact.' 94 In the ICT's first case, it sentenced a Croat infantryman, Dra-
zen Erdemovic, to ten years confinement. The Washington Post re-
ported "the tribunal rejected the hauntingly familiar excuse of Nazi
war criminals-that Erdemovic was following orders ... ,'9' The
ICT has made several similar convictions: (1) prison commander
Zdravco Mucic, for ordering subordinates to commit murders;' 96 (2)
Major General Radislav Krstic, who directed the 1995 attack on Sre-
brenica, for genocide via personal involvement, as well as for his
command responsibility; 97 and (3) paramilitary commander Anto Fu-
Codified Denial of the Defense of Superior Orders, 30 MIL. L. & L. OF WAR REV.
183, 200-04 (1991) (detailing the concerns of third world countries [and Australia,
New Zealand, and Switzerland] that the proposed provision did not adequately bal-
ance humanitarian law with military discipline and it limited its coverage to grave
breaches).
193. See International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory
of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, May 25, 1993, arts. 7(3), 7(4) [hereinafter
ICT Statute]. Articles 7(3) and 7(4) of the ICT Statute actually expand the concept
of respondeat superior. See id. art. 7(3) (stating that acts committed by a subordi-
nate do not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility). The use of the word
"superior," rather than the more frequently found term "commander," allows for
the prosecution of civilians as well as military leaders. See id. Article 7(4) repeats
the now familiar formula: "[t]he fact that an accused person acted pursuant to an
order... of a superior shall not relieve him of criminal responsibility, but may be
considered in mitigation of punishment .... Id. art. 7(4).
194. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, 37 I.L.M. 1182 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia, 1998) (sentencing judgment) ("While the complete defense
based on moral duress and/or a state of necessity stemming from superior orders is
not ruled out absolutely, its conditions of application are particularly strict").
195. Charles Trueheart, Balkan War Crimes Court Imposes First Sentence;
Hague Give Croat Foot Soldier 10 Years, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1996, at A 13.
196. Charles Trueheart, 2 Bosnian Muslims, Croat Convicted of Atrocities
Against Serbs, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 1998, at A34. The conviction of Mucic is
significant because it is the first judgement since the post-World War II tribunals
in Nuremberg and Tokyo to reject "the arguments of mid-level officers who
claimed they were just following orders." Id.
197. Steven Erlanger, Bosnian Serb General Is Arrested; Genocide Charges tied
to Srebrenica Attack, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 3, 1998, at Al (explaining
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rundzija, for failing to stop his subordinates from committing a
rape.' 98 Additionally, in the Rwandan tribunal's first case, Jean-Paul
Akayesu, a civilian mayor, pleaded guilty to ordering the deaths of
more than 2,000 Tutsis by police, soldiers, and Hutu militiamen.'"
In future cases, defendants will no doubt continue to assert the de-
fense of superior orders. Although not yet established, the Statute of
the International Criminal Court, in matters of command responsi-




Since World War II, in American application, there has been no
significant change in the soldier's defense. The law regarding obedi-
ence of superior orders as a defense to law of war violations remains
as it was applied at Nuremberg and in the Subsequent Proceedings.
The current United States Law of War Field Manual reads:
The fact that the law of war has been violated pursuant to an order of a
superior authority, whether military or civil, does not deprive the act in
question of its character as a war crime, nor does it constitute a defense in
the trial of an accused individual, unless he did not know and could not
reasonably have been expected to know that the act ordered was unlaw-
u .... That the individual was acting pursuant to orders may be consid-
ered in mitigation of punishment. 0 '
It is unlikely that there will be any significant change to the cur-
that the ICT accused Krstic of directing the attack on Srebrenica in 1995 where
"some 7,000 Bosnian Muslim men were marched off, presumably to their deaths").
198. See Bosnian War Crimes Panel Finds Commander Guilty in Rape Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1998, at A3 (noting that the ICT found Furundzija guilty of
two counts of war crimes for failing to stop a subordinate's rape of a Bosnian
Muslim).
199. See James C. McKinley, Jr., U.N. Tribunal, in First Such Trial Verdict,
Convicts Rwandan Ex-Mayor of Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1998, at AI (stat-
ing that there was evidence that Akayesu ordered the deaths of several Tutsi intel-
lectuals in his community and eight from another town).
200. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, arts.
25.2., 25.3(b), 28 (setting forth individual criminal responsibility and the responsi-
bility of commanders and other superiors).
201. See FIELD MANUAL20-17, supra note 186, at 182.
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rent standard, or military case law. A potential conflict exists be-
tween American views of manifest illegality and the views of other
states. Because of this conflict, if a non-American United Nations'
commander were to direct the United States contingent to carry out
orders that the Americans view as contrary to customary interna-
tional law, the resolution remains to be seen.202
What can be said with some assurance is that military defendants
will raise the defense of superior orders, ancient as it is, in the future.
Moreover, subordinates will obey illegal orders, given the over-
whelming influence of the military hierarchical structure-particu-
larly in the lower ranks and in combat."203
The defense has seldom prevailed in the past, while its application,
more important than ever, has not grown clearer in today's world.
Finally, those who devote their energies to military justice and to in-
ternational law will continue to wrestle with definitions, intent, and
the accused's understanding. As one United States Army commander
said after a recent training exercise, "I know that if I ever go to war
again, the first person I'm taking is my lawyer,"2°  indicating that
commanders require the counsel of their judge advocates more than
ever.
202. See, e.g., Julius Strauss, U.N. Draws Up Plans for Safe Havens for Serbs,
SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Aug. 29, 1999, at 23 (commenting that the fall of Srebrenica
has been attributed, in part, to differing objectives of the states whose soldiers were
supposed to provide a safe haven).
203. See OSIEL, supra note 119, at 241 n.21 (noting that, as a practical matter, it
is likely that subordinates will obey most illegal orders).
204. Colonel Patrick Finnegan, Operational Law: Plan and Execute, 76 MIL. L.
& L. OF WAR REV. 29, 32 (1996).
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